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ELEVENTH  ANNUAL  LLOYD  K. GARRISON
LECTURE ON ENVIRONMENTAL  LAW
Irreversible and Catastrophic: Global
Warming, Terrorism, and Other Problems,
CASS  R. SUNSTEIN*
Thank you very much.  It's a pleasure to be here.  I had a fan-
tastic  afternoon  on  the  premises.  I'm  really  grateful  for  the
warmth and the substantive conversations.
What  I'm  going to  be  focusing these  comments  on is  some-
thing called the precautionary principle.  And if you haven't heard
of the precautionary  principle, you will  before long. The precau-
tionary principle is very popular in Europe.  It  is an idea for or-
ganizing  environmental  protection  and  regulation  of  risk  in
general.  The United States in the last few years has fought hard
against the precautionary  principle on grounds that are occasion-
ally  obscure.  But  one thing that  we can  say is  that the  United
States, in the last few years, has in one sense firmly endorsed the
precautionary  principle.  In  defending  the  Iraq  War  and  many
measures  to  fight  against  terrorism,  the  United  States empha-
sized  that  you  don't  need  certainty  that  harm  will  occur;  you
1.  This is a lightly edited transcript of the lecture Professor  Sunstein delivered
at Pace University School of Law on April 25, 2005.  The lecture drew heavily on three
works:  Cass Sunstein, Irreversible  and Catastrophic,  CORNELL  L.  REV.  (forthcoming
2006); CAss SUNSTEIN,  LAws  OF FEAR:  BEYOND  THE  PRECAUTIONARY  PRINCIPLE (2005);
and  Cass  Sunstein,  Beyond  the Precautionary  Principle, 151  U.  PA.  L.  REV.  1003
(2003)  [hereinafter Beyond the Precautionary  Principle].
*  Karl N. Llewellyn  Distinguished  Service  Professor of Jurisprudence,  Univer-
sity of Chicago  Law School  and Department  of Political  Science.
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should take preventive  action because  of the risk that harm will
occur.  The basic  idea behind the precautionary  principle is that
we  should  build  a  margin  of safety  into  our  decisions-an  idea
that environmentalists  in  Europe  emphasize  in  thinking  about
global warming, in thinking about destruction of the ozone layer,
in thinking about clean air and clean water in general.2  With re-
spect  to  terrorism, the  Iraq War  was explicitly  defended  on the
grounds  that we  need  a  margin  of safety  in all decision-making.
The White House did not believe that Saddam Hussein definitely
had weapons of mass destruction.  It thought that there was some
probability  that he  had weapons  of mass destruction,  and  that
that was enough to justify action.
I'm going  to be  making three  suggestions  here.  The first is
that the  precautionary  principle  is incoherent.  Risks  are  on  all
sides of social situations.  It's just not possible to take precautions
against all of them at the same time.  So what Europe celebrates
is an unfortunate basis for environmental and other decision-mak-
ing,  because  it  leads  to  paralysis  and  not  to  environmental
protection.
My second  claim is that the precautionary principle gives the
misleading appearance  of helpfulness just because of the way the
human mind works.  When we think about risks-and maybe this
will resonate with your experience in the last six months and pos-
sibly in the next six months-when we think about risks, human
minds tend to single out one or two from the background and fix-
ate on them without thinking about the extent to which efforts to
reduce the risks  on which we're  fixating may give rise to risks of
their  own.  So  if  you  think, I'm  nervous  about  going  into a  bad
neighborhood  at night, I think I'll stay home, it  may be that stay-
ing home introduces its own risks with respect to health or other-
wise.  So  what  I'm  going  to  suggest  is  that  the  precautionary
principle, which is incoherent, gives  the appearance  of coherence
and usefulness because human minds select some of the universe
of relevant risks.
Those  are  negative  claims.  Those  are  points  against  our
friends in Europe.  The third claim is an effort to rescue the pre-
2.  See,  e.g.,  INDOR  GOKLANY,  THE  PRECAUTIONARY  PRINCIPLE:  A  CRITICAL  AP-
PRAISAL  OF ENVIRONMENTAL  RISK ASSESSMENT  5 (2001)  ("'In order to protect the envi-
ronment, the precautionary  approach  shall be widely  applied by States according  to
their  capabilities'"  (quoting U.N.  Conference  on Environment  & Development  (UN-
CED), June 3-14,  1992, Rio Declaration  on Environment and Development, Principle
15, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26  (Aug. 12,  1992)  [hereinafter  Principle  15])).
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cautionary principle by suggesting that if we focus on a subset of
risks,  including  environmental  risks, we  can  make  progress  to-
ward a more sensible way of orienting our laws and policies.  And
the subset that I'm going to identify includes those risks that are
irreversible  and  catastrophic.  Hence  my  title, Irreversible and
Catastrophic-my  cheerful title-the thought being that irreversi-
ble and catastrophic risks are ones against which we ought to take
precautions,  and those are the ones  for which the precautionary
principle is sensible.  The rest is just going to be footnotes.  But in
law-professor fashion, there are going to be a lot of footnotes and
they're  going to be pretty long.  So here goes.
Footnote one: What is the precautionary principle with which
I started?  There are some versions that are weak and there are
some versions that are strong.  The weak version suggests that a
lack of decisive  evidence of harm ought not to be a ground  for re-
fusing to regulate.  Think for example about smoking and tobacco
regulation  in the  1960s.  Then, we didn't  have decisive  evidence
that smoking was going to cause cancer, but sensible people didn't
smoke  on  the ground that they were  going  to build  a margin  of
safety into their decision by saying, The fact that there isn't defin-
itive  evidence  isn't a reason  to refrain  from  precaution.  So the
1992 Rio Declaration  involving climate change  says, "'lack of full
scientific  certainty  shall  not be  used  as  a reason for postponing
cost-effective  measures  to prevent environmental  degradation."'3
Think for example about global warming or air pollution or water
pollution, where we don't have a full sense of how large the harm
is.
The ministerial  declaration of an international  conference on
the  protection  of the North  Sea  is in the same  weak vein:  "'[A]
precautionary principle  is necessary which may require action to
control inputs of [dangerous]  substances even before a causal link
has  been  established  by  absolutely  clear  scientific  evidence."' 4
Straightforward  and sensible.
Here's  a stronger version, from a group of environmentalists
in the  1990s:  "When an activity raises threats  of harm to human
3.  BJORN  LOMBORG,  THE  SKEPTICAL ENVIRONMENTALIST:  MEASURING  THE  REAL
STATE  OF  THE  WORLD  348  (Hugh  Matthews  trans.,  Cambridge  Univ.  Press  2001)
(quoting Principle 15, supra note 2).
4.  Julian Morris, Defining the Precautionary  Principle, in RETHINKING  RISK AND
THE PRECAUTIONARY  PRINCIPLE  1,  3 (Julian Morris ed., 2000) (quoting Second Interna-
tional Conference  on the Protection of the North Sea (SICPNS), Ministerial  Declara-
tion (1987)).
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health  or  the  environment,  precautionary  measures  should  be
taken,  even if  some  cause  and  effect  relationships  are not  fully
established scientifically.  In this context, the proponent of the ac-
tivity, rather than the public, should bear the burden of proof."5  It
should be clear that that's  a stronger version because it  puts the
burden  of proof on those who want to expose people to risk.  This
version doesn't merely say lack of certainty of harm is not a reason
for  refraining  from  regulation.  So the  proponent  of an  activity
bears the burden  of proof.
In Europe, it's sometimes said that a margin of safety must be
built  into all decision-making. 6  And think of that as the  strong
version  of the precautionary  principle-a margin of safety in all
decision-making.  So,  in  one  European  understanding,  "[A]ction
should be taken to correct a problem as soon as there is evidence
that harm may occur..  . ."7  The possibility that harm may occur
is a justification for corrective action.
And, "The precautionary principle mandates where there is a
risk of significant  damage to others or to future generations, then
decisions  should be made so as to prevent such activities from be-
ing conducted unless  and until scientific  evidence shows that the
damage will not occur."8  That doesn't build a margin of safety.  It
doesn't just  shift  the  burden  of proof.  It  says  that  it  must  be
shown by a proponent of action that damage will not occur.
The weak version-that  is the version  that  says lack  of full
scientific  certainty isn't  a  reason  to refrain  from action-is  fine
and  good.  I  don't  have anything  to  say against that.  What  I'm
going to try to criticize as incoherent is the strong version, that is,
the version that requires a demonstration of absolute safety by the
proponents  of the activity.
Now, to get at the problem  we need some  examples.  And let
me just give  four in which  the precautionary  principle  has  been
invoked, both in the United States and in Europe,  as a basis for
thinking  about  environmental  protection.  One  example,  obvi-
5.  Id.  at 5  (citation omitted).  A strong version  is defended  in  Carolyn  Raffen-
sperger  & Peter L. deFur, Implementing the Precautionary  Principle:  Rigorous Sci-
ence and Solid Ethics, 5 HUM.  & ECOLOGICAL  RISK ASSESSMENT  933 (1999).
6.  See LOMBORG,  supra note  3,  at 349.
7.  Beyond  the Precautionary  Principle, supra note  1,  at  1013  (quoting  Paul
McFedries,  Precautionary Principle, WordSpy,  Jan.  23,  2002,  at  http://www.
logophilia.conWordSpy/precautionaryprinciple.asp).
8.  The  Cloning of Humans and Genetic Modifications: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on Appropriations, 107th  Cong. (2002) (statement of Dr. Brent Blackwelder,
President, Friends  of the Earth).
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ously, is genetic engineering of organisms.  Many people who like
the  precautionary  principle  (especially  in Europe,  and there's  a
movement  to  this  effect  in the United  States),  say that genetic
modifications of organisms give rise to risks.9  We don't know their
magnitude.  In the view of some people, we should take a precau-
tionary approach and not allow genetic engineering. 10
Nuclear power  is  another  one, where  the  halting of nuclear
power plants in the United States in the last couple of decades has
been  driven in part by  a precautionary  idea that nuclear  power
gives  rise to serious risks.11
Global warming is an area where the United States' perceived
intransigence  has been  criticized  in Europe  for failing to be  pre-
cautionary.  It's not clear that global warming will occur in a way
that's extremely damaging, or at least some people so think.  And
that, Europeans say, is not a reason for refraining from action; the
fact that it's  a possible risk means that we  should take very ag-
gressive regulatory  action. 12
The Bush Administration's most controversial  early decision,
see if you remember  this, involved arsenic  in drinking water, in
which  the Bush Administration  suspended the  Clinton Adminis-
tration's  proposal,  which was  to  reduce  arsenic  levels  from  fifty
parts per billion  to ten parts per billion. 13
In  all four of those areas,  the precautionary  principle is said
to require aggressive protection.  What I'm going to try to argue is
that that's just not so, that for each of these problems the precau-
tionary principle forbids the very steps that it requires.  Let's go at
it first by thinking about genetic engineering of food  and arsenic.
Genetic  engineering  of food,  it's  true, gives  rise to  risk;  and the
precautionary  principle  calls  for  precautions  against  risk.  The
problem is, if we  don't  allow  genetic engineering  of food, we will
give rise to risks of starvation; because there's some hope, specula-
9.  See Benoit Morel et al., Pesticide  Resistance, the Precautionary  Principle,  and
the Regulation of Bt Corn: Real Option and Rational Option Approaches to Decision-
making, in BATTLING  RESISTANCE  To ANTIBIOTICS  AND  PESTICIDES  184,  185 (Ramanan
Laxminarayan ed.,  2003).
10.  See  GOKLANY,  supra note  2, at 55.
11.  Energy  Information  Administration,  Nuclear Power,  http://www.eia.doe.gov/
cneaf/nuclear/page/nuc-generation/newnuc2.html  (last visited  Sept.  29,  2005)  ("No
new  commercial reactors have come on line in the United States since Watts Bar 1 in
1996.").
12.  See, e.g., Graciela  Chichilnisky & Geoffrey Heal, Global Environmental  Risks,
7 J.  ECON.  PERSPS.  65,  76  (1993).
13.  See Cass  R.  Sunstein,  The Arithmetic of Arsenic, 90  GEO.  L.  J.  2255,  2257,
2261, 2269,  2298  (2002).
2005-20061
58  PACE ENVIRONMENTAL  LAW REVIEW
tive to be  sure, that genetic engineering  of food  can  deliver  safe
and nutritious and inexpensive  food to countries where this is lit-
erally lifesaving.14  A ban on genetic engineering of food is literally
dangerous  to  people  who have  a great  deal to  gain from  genetic
modification.  So my suggestion is that the precautionary principle
forbids  genetic  modification  of food because  it  gives  rise  to risk,
but the precautionary  principle  also forbids  forbidding  of genetic
engineering of food because forbidding genetic engineering of food
gives rise to risk.
Let's  explore  another  example:  arsenic.  The  former head  of
the  Environmental  Protection  Agency,  Administrator  Christine
Whitman, said in the early days of trying to defend the suspension
of regulation, that there's something we're worried about, which is
the expense of the rule that costs $210 million, and for some water
systems  that burden  is  going  to  be  very  hard.15  And  for  some
users of water that's going to be very expensive-up  to $400  per
year or more.16  And what we're worried about is they're going to
stop relying on their water  companies  and they're  going to start
using wells, local wells.' 7  What worries us about those local wells
is that they are  contaminated.' 8  What Administrator  Whitman
argued,  and  it  wasn't  an  implausible  worry  (it  may  have  been
wrong, but it  wasn't implausible), was that the arsenic regulation
would  give rise to risks of its own in the form of increased use  of
highly contaminated,  dirty well water.
Now,  mind you, for the purposes of the precautionary princi-
ple, the mere fact that the Administrator has legitimate concerns
should  be decisive.  Remember?  The  burden  of proof switches-
the possibility that harm may occur is the reason for the invoking
of the  principle.  The  arsenic  regulation  stands  both mandated
and  condemned  by the  precautionary  principle.  Mandated,  be-
cause there's  a risk  of cancer  from  levels  of arsenic  in  drinking
water that  President  Bush was thinking  of allowing.19  But the
14.  See  Chantal  Pohl  Nielson  & Kym  Anderson,  Golden Rice and the Looming
GMO Trade  Debate: Implications  for the Poor 19 (Ctr. for Int'l Econ. Stud., Discussion
Paper No.  0322,  2003), available at http://adelaide.edu/au/cies/papers/0322.pdf.
15.  See Sunstein, supra note  13, at 2294-95.
16.  See id. at 2294.
17.  See News Hour with Jim Lehrer:  Interview with Christine  Whitman (PBS tele-
vision  broadcast  Apr.  17,  2001),  available at  http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/
white-house/jan-june0l/whitman_4-17.html.
18.  See id.
19.  Cat Lazaroff, Bush Administration Throws Out New Arsenic Standard,  ENV'T
NEWS  SERVICE,  Mar.  20,  2001,  http://ens-newswire.com/ens/mar2001/2001-03-20-
06.asp.
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precautionary principle also forbids the very regulation because it
gives rise to substitute risks.
Think for a  moment, if  you would, about  nuclear  power and
global  warming,  my  other two  examples.  Nuclear  power  seems
condemned by the precautionary principle.  But its proponents say
the  following:  If  you're  really  worried  about  air  pollution  and
global  warming,  you  ought  to  rely  on  nuclear  power,  which  is
much  better  than fossil  fuels  which  come  from  coal-fired  power
plants.20  So they say that aggressive regulation of nuclear power
runs  afoul  of the precautionary  principle  because  it  gives rise to
risks in the form of increased reliance on coal-fired  power plants,
which make the air dirty and which contribute to global warming.
Forbidding  nuclear  power  seems  required  by  the  precautionary
principle,  and in a way it is.  But forbidding nuclear power is also
unacceptable  under the precautionary principle because if you for-
bid nuclear  power, you're  going to increase  reliance  on coal-fired
power plants.
What I'm saying with these examples-genetic  modification,
nuclear  power, and arsenic-is that risks are on all sides of social
situations.  Not just one.  If you push against one risk, it's inevita-
ble that you'll be giving rise to another risk.  This should be famil-
iar in  everyday  life.  Think,  for  example,  of that  risk-avoidance
strategy called "staying at home all day."  Probably not very good
for your health.  Or think, for example,  of the strategy of driving,
rather  than flying,  for those  who fear the  risks  associated with
airplanes.  Driving is risky, too.  There is no way of avoiding risks.
What  about  global  warming?  Well,  the  simple  fact  is that
regulations, especially  in poor countries,  that cost a lot to reduce
carbon  dioxide  emissions,  will  increase-significantly-expendi-
tures.21  And  if the  expense  is  high enough,  those  expenditures
will give rise to risks, for example in the form of dying of too much
heat-if energy  prices  increase,  you  might not be  able  to  afford
fans  or  air-conditioning.  That  last  point  about  global  warming
suggests that the very fact that risk regulation is often expensive
creates  risks  of its  own.22  And  in  fact,  there  are  studies  sug-
20.  See  Nuclear  Energy  Institute,  Environmental  Preservation,  http://www.nei.
orglindex.asp?catnum=2&catid=38  (last visited Sept. 29, 2005).
21.  See Randall  Lutter  & John  F.  Morrall, III,  Health-Health  Analysis: A New
Way to Evaluate Health and Safety Regulation, 8 J.  RISK  &  UNCERTAINTY  43  (1994).
22.  See Robert  W. Hahn et al.,  Do Federal Regulations Reduce Mortality? (AEI-
Brookings  Joint  Ctr.  for  Reg.  Stud.,  2000),  available  at  http://ssrn.com/
abstract=259786.
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gesting that in the United States, every time the government  re-
quires industry  to  spend $10  million to  $30  million, at least one
person  dies.23  The mechanism by which the multi-million  dollar
expenditure  produces death isn't agreed  upon,24 but think for ex-
ample  of the  simple  fact  that  a  very  expensive  regulation  will
probably increase unemployment and therefore poverty, neither of
which is good for your health.  So my suggestion is that under the
precautionary  principle (which forbids government from allowing
possible risk to occur), any regulation of an environmentally risky
activity is both required by the precautionary principle and forbid-
den by  the precautionary  principle  for the  simple  reason that  it
imposes a possible risk of death, against which we ought to take
precautions.
So this is why  I  suggest that the precautionary  principle,  in
its strong forms, is incoherent.  It can be made sensible only if we
single  out some subset of the risks that social situations present.
But it's  impossible  to  be  universally  precautionary.  We  can  be
precautionary  with respect to some risks, but not with respect to
risks in general.  And if this seems implausible,  try it.  Try to be
precautionary in general in the next day or two.  Chances are that
precautions  will  give  rise  to  the  very  risks  that  precautions
induce.
Why then are Europeans  and many others  excited  about the
precautionary  principle?  I suggest that the precautionary princi-
ple becomes  operational  because  of the way human minds work,
and more particularly,  because in assessing risks we tend to rely
on  something  that  has  an  elaborate  name-but  it's  a  pretty
straightforward  idea-called  the  "availability  heuristic."  The
availability heuristic says that we assess risks by thinking about
the  ease with which we can  recall  an example  in which  the risk
came to fruition.25  So if we  don't know  a lot about certain  situa-
tions,  we  ask,  Can  we  think  of an  example  in  which  the  risk
occurred?
Here's a simple way of illustrating the use of the availability
heuristic:  Suppose that you ask people how many words on a page,
23.  Michael  Gough,  Ph.D,  "Environmental Cancer"  Isn't What  We  Thought  or
Were Told (Mar.  6,  1997), http://cato.org/testimony/ct-mg030697.html  (written testi-
mony before Senate  Cancer Coalition).
24.  See Lutter & Morrall, supra note 21, at 49  tbl.1.
25.  See  Amos  Tversky  &  Daniel  Kahneman,  Judgment  Under  Uncertainty:
Heuristics  and Biases, in  JUDGMENT  UNDER  UNCERTAINTY:  HEURISITCS  AND  BIAsEs  3,
11-14 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds.,  1982).
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a random page,  have as the last three letters "ing."  Most people
tend  to  say twenty, twenty-five,  fifteen.  If you ask  people  how
many words on this page have as the second-to-last letter "n," peo-
ple  say  four,  five.  The reason  is that it's  easy  to think  of "ing"
words, but not easy to think of words that have  as the second-to-
last letter "n."  So, too, in thinking about whether something gives
rise to risks: Available instances  often drive judgments.
An example  is a recent  cross-national study  of risk from ter-
rorism  and risk from SARS,  the illness that struck Canada,  and
China much worse, in the last few years.26  The studies found that
Americans  believed that the terrorism  risk is much higher than
the SARS  risk, and Canadians just the opposite.27  The disparity
was so large that it  couldn't easily be justified by reference to real-
ity.28  It's just that Americans have an acute sense, because of the
September  11th attacks, of the risk of terrorism, and the sense of
the risk is probably wildly inflated.  People tend to think that the
chance  that they,  themselves, will  die in a  terrorist  attack next
year  is about  8 percent-far  too high29-whereas  we  don't have
experiences  with  SARS.  So  the  fact that terrorism  is  available
cognitively  and comes  to  our  minds,  and  SARS  doesn't, helps  to
drive judgments.
A  study of risk perceptions,  in the  sense  of public  concerns
about  risks in the  United  States  for the past thirty years  or so,
showed-and  this is  a happy fact-that our concern  about risks
basically  tracks  fluctuations  in  real  risks.30  So  as  certain  risks
increase,  people  are  more  worried,  and  as  other  risks decrease,
people are less worried.  But there was one exception to this happy
finding, which is panic bred by vivid illustrations in which harm
came  to fruition.31  So the  mistakes, in which people had an un-
justly  inflated  sense  of risk,  came  from  fear  of suicide,  fear  of
herpes, and fear of AIDS, in contexts in which the vivid new exam-
ple made people far more scared than reality warranted. 32  So the
conclusion is when people got it wrong, it was because  a particu-
larly vivid case  received  considerable  media attention.33
26.  See generally Neil Feigenson et al., Perceptions  of Terrorism  and Disease  Risk:
A Cross-National Comparison, 69 Mo.  L. REV.  991  (2004).
27.  See id.  at 996.
28.  See  id.  at 1008.
29.  See id.  at 996.
30.  Id.
31.  Id.
32.  See Feigenson  et al., supra note 26, at 996.
33.  Id.
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A study of Kenya and Malawi  tried to figure out when people
are worried about and taking precautions against AIDS.34  When
do  they  use  in  their  own  behavior  precautionary  principles  to
guard against  the AIDS  risk?  The  answer  was  clear:  Had  they
observed  or heard about  an illness  or death?35  The  availability
heuristic drove  people's risk assessment.
My suggestion  is, when the United States takes  precautions
against the risks posed  by terrorism, we're not following the pre-
cautionary  principle in the  abstract;  it's because  that particular
risk is  available  to  our  minds.  When  Europeans  are  especially
concerned about mad-cow disease or other risks, it's because those
are the risks  that  are cognitively  available  to  them.  I am  sug-
gesting that Europe  does  not in fact practice  precaution  in gen-
eral-that  it's  not  a  possibility.  It  adopts  a  precautionary
principle against a particular subcategory of risks that are readily
available to European thinking, just because  of their own  recent
experiences.
Okay,  that's  the  end  of that  footnote,  which  ends  with  the
claim that it  is not possible  to be  precautionary in general-Eu-
rope isn't.  The apparent  workability  of the precautionary princi-
ple rests  on the fact that human minds naturally fixate  on some
sets  of risks and not  on others.  When  in the context  of genetic
modification  of food,  many  people  are  nervous  about  the  risks
posed  by genetic  modification-and  it  does  pose  risks-they are
fixating on those, and are ignoring the risks posed by refusing to
use  a technology that has  a lot of promise.36  I'm not suggesting
that we  go  forward  with genetic  modification  more  than we  al-
ready have, or that those who like it are right and those who don't
like it are wrong.  I'm only suggesting that the precautionary prin-
ciple isn't a helpful entry into the debate.
Okay, now these footnotes have been destructive.  Now we're
going to try to get constructive.  What  I'm going to try to do is to
figure out a way in which the precautionary principle can be made
34.  See Jere R. Behrman et al., Social Networks, HIVIAIDS, and  Risk Perceptions
1  (Penn. Inst.  for Econ.  Res.,  Working  Paper No.  03-007, 2003),  available at http:l!
ssrn.com/abstract=382844.
35.  See id.  at 18-19.
36.  See  the discussion  of risk-related tradeoffs  in  John  D. Graham  & Jonathan
Baert Wiener, Confronting Risk Tradeoffs, in  RISK  Vs.  RISK:  TRADEOFFS  IN  PROTECT-
ING  HEALTH AND THE  ENVIRONMENT  1,  1-41 (John D. Graham & Jonathan Baert Wie-
ner  eds.,  1995);  Cass  R.  Sunstein,  Health-Health Tradeoffs, in  RISK  AND  REASON:
SAFETY,  LAW,  AND  THE  ENVIRONMENT  133,  133-52  (2002); Nielson  & Anderson, supra
note  14.
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workable  for purposes  of environmental  law  and environmental
protection,  possibly with regulation  in general, conceivably  even
for human  life.
A first way of trying to get at this might be to suggest that in
the  environmental  context  there's  a  distinctive  argument  for  a
precautionary  principle.  Meaning,  there  is  an  argument  that
would say that environmental risks in particular  deserve precau-
tionary thinking, even if risks in general don't and can't.  The idea
might be that environmental  risks are frequently long-term risks
and not short-term risks-which is to say incidents of their occur-
rence  won't readily  come  to mind  like  the risks associated  with
workplace  accidents-and also that the risks often are faced by a
lot of people at once in the form of a statistical probability, rather
than  a concentrated  group of people  who are organized.  In addi-
tion, environmental  risks are often faced by wildlife and animals,
which don't have a voice in environmental protection.  You might
say, for these reasons, there is a kind of a built-in problem, which
is that environmental  risks will receive less attention than they
deserve.  It's possible.
But I want to try to build up a coherent precautionary princi-
ple  more  narrowly  by focusing  on the problems  of irreversibility
and potential  catastrophe.  Let's  notice that some  subsets of the
risks that the human species  faces are irreversible if they come to
fruition-meaning that if they happen, they happen permanently
or they can't be stopped except at extraordinary  cost.  Extinction
of species  from which human beings benefit  or not, or which are
important to human beings for moral or other reasons-that's per-
manent.  It's an irreversible risk.  Genetic modification has three
irreversible  risks associated with  it,  one  of which  is its effect  on
pest  resistance;  that  may  be  either  literally  irreversible  or  ex-
tremely  costly  to  reverse.37  The  risks  associated  with  global
warming have an irreversible feature in that carbon  dioxide is in
the  atmosphere  for a  long,  long time-hundreds  of years.38  So
what we're doing now will face future generations; unless technol-
ogies  change, there's not much they can do about that.
37.  See Justus Wesseler, Resistance Economics of Transgenic Crops Under Uncer-
tainty: A Real Option Approach, in BATTLING  RESISTANCE  TO  ANTIBIOTICS  AND  PESTI-
CIDES,  supra note 9, at 214, 215-16.
38.  See ARIC Atmosphere, Climate & Environment Information Programme, Car-
bon  Dioxide,  http://www.ace.mmu.ac.uk/Resources/Teaching-PacksfKey-Stage_4/Cli-
mateChange/02t.html  (last visited Sept. 22,  2005).
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It just so happens  that some formulations  of the precaution-
ary principle are alert to this point.  The United Nations Economic
Conference  for Europe in  1992 said, "'Where  there are threats of
...  irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be
used as a reason for postponing ...  measures  to prevent environ-
mental  degradation."' 39  The  final declaration  of the  first  Euro-
pean Seas at Risk Conference says that "'if the worst case scenario
for a certain activity is serious enough, then even a small amount
of doubt as to safety of that activity is sufficient to stop it  taking
place,"' with clear emphasis in context on the irreversible  nature
of the worst-case scenario.40
One way  to get at the problem of irreversibility is just to no-
tice that when human beings  are asked how much they value  en-
vironmental  goods,  they  tend  to  put  their  values  into  three
separate  categories:  (1)  How  much  would  you  value  to  use  the
good?  Call it a pristine area or a beach.  And then there's a dollar
amount:  (2)  How  much would  you  be  willing to  pay  to  have  an
option to  use  the  good  in  the  future?  Then  there's  an  amount
that's separate and not identical to the amount that people would
pay to use the good.  And (3),  there's also an amount that people
would  be  willing  to  pay  to  maintain  the  existence  of the  good.
What I want to emphasize  here is that people are willing to pay
something to have an option to prevent a harm that could prove to
be irreversible in the future.
If we notice the existence of option value, we can just say that
when a decision,  a regulatory decision, involves uncertainty about
what the future will bring, and when it's  possible to  resolve the
uncertainty as time goes on, and when one or more alternatives is
irreversible,  it just makes a lot of sense to pay something extra to
protect against the irreversible bad outcome.  So my suggestion is,
if there's an irreversible harm on the one side and a reversible one
on the other, we should pay the extra amount to protect ourselves
against the irreversible  harm.
What  might  this  mean  concretely?  Well,  I've  referred  to
global warming as a problem of irreversibility.  People do dispute
the nature of the threat from global  warming.  And  so it's tempt-
ing to say what President Bush has said, which is that we should
wait to regulate  until we  have more  information.  Often  it  does
39.  GoKLANY,  supra note  2, at 5  (quoting Principle  15, supra note  2).
40.  See  Richard  B.  Stewart, Environmental Regulatory Decision Making Under
Uncertainty, in  AN  INTRODUCTION  TO  THE  LAW  AND  ECONOMICS  OF  ENVIRONMENTAL
POLICY:  ISSUES  IN  INSTITUTIONAL  DESIGN  (2002).
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make  sense to say, if  you don't know the magnitude  of the prob-
lem, you should wait until you have clearer  information  about it
before spending money to prevent it.  But in the context of global
warming, there's  a big problem  with waiting, which  is the  irre-
versible effect  of greenhouse  gas  emissions  on  atmospheric  con-
centrations  of those  gases.41  So  if we  make  emission cuts  now,
we're essentially  purchasing  an option to enable global  warming
to be  stopped or slowed in the future at a  lower cost.  The basic
idea is that because  of the irreversible  nature  of carbon  dioxide
emissions,  to  expend resources  now  serves to  protect  the future
wealth by reducing their costs.
This is just to describe a narrow version of the precautionary
principle.  Let's call it the Irreversible Harm Precautionary Princi-
ple, which doesn't run afoul of the problem of incoherence,  which
doesn't depend on any selectivity in human minds, depending  on
whether examples  are evident.  It just  draws  attention to  a dis-
tinctive feature of certain kinds of risks-environmental risks and
some risks posed by terrorists.
Now  let's  shift from the problem of irreversible  harm to the
problem of catastrophic harm.  Let's try to figure out how to make
these go away, these harms, or to protect the human race against
them.  Let's have a little thought experiment.  And if  I had paper
or a mind-reading machine,  or had  enough  paper to  pass out  to
you, we  actually  could  find the answers.  But think, if you will,
about the following problem: Which do you think is a higher prior-
ity-a one-in-ten risk that 2000 people will die?  Or a one-in-one-
million chance that 200 million people will die?  Suppose that the
government is deciding between two programs: one that will elimi-
nate a one-in-ten  risk that 2000 people will die, and one that will
eliminate the one-in-a-million risk that 200 million people will die.
Which should the government choose?  They cost the same.
One question you might ask yourself, if you're the President
of the United States is, Which of those should you give higher pri-
ority to?  Another question you might ask yourself is, What do you
think most people would say in answering that question?
I've now asked hundreds of people that question,  and the an-
swer is clear.  The vast majority of people think that the one-in-a-
million chance of 200 million deaths is lower priority.  Most people
think the one-in-ten  chance of 2000 deaths deserves  more  atten-
tion than the one-in-one-million  chance  of 200 million deaths.
41.  See  RICHARD  A. POSNER,  CATASTROPHE  161  (2004).
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There  are  a couple  of ways  to think  about this  public judg-
ment that the higher probability  of that  outcome is  worth more
than the very low probability catastrophe.  The first thing to think
of, if we're  economists,  involves  expected  value.42  And let's just
notice that the  two problems  I  gave have identical  expected  val-
ues:  200 lives.  Each  involves 200 lives.  So if human beings  con-
sider the  one-in-ten  chance  of 2000  deaths  to be higher  priority
than the tiny chance of 200 million deaths, there's possibly some-
thing  wrong  there.  On  standard  accounts  of  rationality,  they
should  be treated the same.  That's  the first cut  of the  problem:
that there  seems to be something in human cognition that some-
times treats tiny probabilities,  even of extreme disaster, as worth
less than their expected value.43  And maybe  the United  States'
caution about global warming has something to do with the under-
valuing of low risks of catastrophe.
But I think  it's worse  than that-that people's  answers  are
even  worse  than they  seem.  Think  for a moment what it  would
mean for 200 million people to die.  Would that be a simple arith-
metic  multiplier  of 2000  people dying-is  it just a matter of ad-
ding the right number  of zeroes?  Probably  it's a  lot worse  than
that.  If 200 million Americans die-and that's what I've given in
the survey-then, our nation is devastated.  What kind of institu-
tions would we have if two-thirds of our country is lost? What kind
of government  could  we have?  How  many  generations  would  it
take to  replicate the system we now have?  Two hundred million
deaths is a lot worse than adding the relevant zeros to 2000.  And
human beings  seem not easily to understand that fact.
This is just a suggestion that catastrophic risks deserve some
kind  of precautionary  principle,  if  only  to  overcome  the  human
tendency to treat them as worth less than their expected value, if
you simply do the multiplication; and worth much less than their
real expected value, if you consider the ancillary effects.  In some
domains we want to be risk averse.  That is, we want to build in a
big margin  of safety.  And for  a risk of catastrophic  harm, that
makes a lot of sense.
I am attempting to sketch a distinctive precautionary  princi-
ple.  It  has a name, which won't  surprise you:  the  Catastrophic
Harm Precautionary  Principle.  And the Catastrophic Harm Pre-
cautionary Principle  is intended as a narrow replacement  for the
42.  See Tversky & Kahneman, supra note  25, at 14-18.
43.  See Gary H. McClelland  et al., Insurance  for Low-Probability Hazards:  A Bi-
modal Response to Unlikely Events, 7 J.  RISK &  UNCERTAINTY  95,  95,  102  (1993).
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precautionary  principle.  We  have  to  make  a  few  qualifications.
One is that if you make  efforts  to reduce  catastrophic  harm, you
might give rise to  catastrophic risk just by doing that.  It's possi-
ble.  And so the Catastrophic Harm Precautionary Principle some-
times does run into the incoherence  problem.
Example: the Iraq War.  Put to one side the question whether
you're for it  or against it.  The Iraq War was best defended on the
grounds that it averted a catastrophic harm, and best criticized on
the grounds that it gave rise to a catastrophic harm in the form of
increased  hatred of the  United States  and better resources  and
manpower for terrorist activity.  So, this is just to suggest that the
Catastrophic  Harm  Precautionary  Principle  is  coherent,  but  it
can't work in a case in which its deployment  gives rise to  a cata-
strophic harm  of its own.
Now turn to global warming.  Those who think we ought not
to be taking very expensive steps to avert global warming have, as
the best arrow in their quiver, the suggestion that those very steps
give  rise  to risk of catastrophic  harm.  This  argument would  be
plausible if the cost of reducing global warming significantly were
so high that it  would  produce  mass unemployment  and poverty.
But in a context in which there is a catastrophic harm on one side
and no catastrophic harm introduced by reducing it, then we have
an argument for the Catastrophic Harm Precautionary  Principle.
I want to be a little more concrete about all this by introduc-
ing a couple of suggestions for the use of the Catastrophic Harm
Precautionary  Principle.  The  first  is  that  even  for  the  Cata-
strophic  Harm  Precautionary  Principle,  the  cost  matters.  If  it
costs  a fortune to  eliminate  a catastrophic harm, that's different
from if you can eliminate the catastrophic harm at essentially zero
cost.  The  second thing to  say about the Catastrophic Harm Pre-
cautionary  Principle  is, we want to know who  is being protected
from catastrophic harm and who is paying the cost of eliminating
catastrophic harm.  In the context of global warming, it's just the
case that the United States  has  probably relatively  little to fear
from global warming.  First, because our economy does not depend
fundamentally  on  agriculture,44  and  second  because  we're  rich
and can adapt pretty  well.45  So even in the worst-case  scenarios
for  global  warming, the United  States  is probably  not at  severe
risk.  Poor countries,  on the other hand, for which  agriculture is
44.  See WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS  &  JOSEPH BOYER, WARMING  THE WORLD:  ECONOMIC
MODELS  OF  GLOBAL  WARMING  69-98 (2000).
45.  See id. at 96-98.
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everything, are in very  severe danger.46  They have a risk of eco-
nomic  devastation,  of very serious human  health  problems,  and
they don't have the wealth to respond to the risk. 47  Global warm-
ing is plausibly seen (it's not typically analyzed in these terms, but
it's plausibly  seen  in these  terms),  as  a kind  of tort imposed  by
wealthy  countries  on poor  ones through  their  global greenhouse
gas emissions.  And that has to bear  on the analysis of what the
obligations of wealthy  countries are.
If we bear that in mind, we are  well  on the way to develop-
ing-to tie all bits of the argument together-an Irreversible  and
Catastrophic  Harm  Precautionary  Principle.  The  principle  could
be used for the context of global warming-suggesting  that while
the Kyoto  Protocol was imperfect,  other approaches  would  make
sense  as  a  way  of combating  global  warming.  Consider  an  ap-
proach that would require general and broad participation by In-
dia and China, as well as by Germany and Russia and the United
States.  Such an approach  might give a permit for greenhouse gas
emissions  to  poor countries  because  they  need them  in  order  to
have  their economies  grow.  Poor  countries  would be  allowed  to
sell their emissions  rights  to the United States,  which has more
money-and  that  would  be  good  on  distributional  grounds,  be-
cause it would help the poor.  A sensible approach would have in-
creasing  intensity  of  reductions  over  time,  so  it  doesn't  cause
massive poverty and unemployment  in the short run, but allows
reductions  to  occur  with  increasing  severity  as  technology
changes.  In the United States, we might have a kind of cap-and-
trade  system,  where  we  cap  our  carbon  dioxide  emissions,  or
greenhouse contributions  generally, and  allow trading internally.
Some  system  of this  general  kind  would  work;  it  wouldn't
bankrupt us;  it  would be  a response  to the tort-like character  of
the current situation; and it would adopt not a general idea of pre-
caution, but precaution in this particular context  of catastrophic
and irreversible risk.
I'm just about  done.  My  first and negative  submission  has
been that the precautionary principle is incoherent.  It  forbids the
very steps that it requires.  My second argument has been that the
precautionary  principle  gives  the  illusion  of coherence  because
human  minds naturally  fixate  on  a  subset  of risks that human
beings  encounter,  and  so  the  precautionary  principle  operates
46.  See id. at 69-98.
47.  See id. at 98.
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with disregard for the other risks that are inevitably part of social
situations  and  that  are  sometimes  introduced  by  precautions
themselves.  The  Irreversible  Harm  Precautionary  Principle,
which maybe underlies the Endangered Species Act,48  is coherent.
To evaluate it,  we have to know the magnitude of the risk that the
Irreversible Harm Precautionary Principle is combating.  The Cat-
astrophic  Harm  Precautionary  Principle  is coherent.  The  major
qualification is that we have to make sure that our steps that are
reducing  catastrophic  harm  aren't  themselves  introducing  cata-
strophic harm.
So my main suggestion has been that to operate sensibly, any
counsel for precaution  has to be attentive to the full range of con-
sequences,  not simply to a subset of them.  But suitably modified,
a precautionary principle focused  on irreversibility  and potential
catastrophe  deserves a prominent place not only in the law of en-
vironmental protection, but in the everyday life of human beings.
Thank you.
48.  Endangered  Species Act  of 1973,  16 U.S.C.  §§  1531-1543  (2000).
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